Stop Coatesville's Condemnation of family farm to build a Golf Course

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TO: Honorable Tim Hennessey

FROM: Edward C. Hussie, Chief Counsel

RE: Condemnation of Golf Course

In response to your request, I am enclosing:

  • A copy of the 1964 Joint State Commission Report which is the most comprehensive embodiment of the legislative intent behind the adoption of our current Eminent Domain Code. This report is unlikely to be of any meaningful assistance to the constituent since the Eminent Domain Code generally addresses issues relating largely to procedure, damages and evidence rather than the scope of any condemnor's power to condemn property, which power is scattered throughout a multitude of specific authorizing statutes such as the ones discussed below.

  • 53 P.S. § 37801 which empowers third class cities to condemn land for the purpose of establishing "recreation places."

  • 53 P.S. § 38703 which empowers third class cities to condemn land for the purpose of establishing recreation places which it defines to consist of "public parks, parkways, playgrounds, playfields, gymnasiums, public baths, swimming pools or indoor recreation centers. ..." Unlike § 37801, § 38703 expressly authorizes third class cities to condemn lands outside city limits in furtherance of the foregoing purposes.

  • A Supreme Court opinion in Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 200 A. 834 (1938), which declared, by way of dicta (since the case did not involve a golf course), that "the taking of land for a public golf course or playground would be for a public use although, while some players are using it, all other members of the public are necessarily excluded from utilizing and enjoying the facilities." It does not automatically follow that a given government entity possesses the specific statutory authority to condemn land for use as a public golf course merely because a public golf course may fall within the scope of a "public use" for condemnation purposes. In this regard, it would appear to me as though the city would have to persuade the court that a golf course qualifies as a "recreational place": (a) under § 37801; or (b) under § 38703 if it wishes to condemn land beyond its borders for this purpose. It might be somewhat more difficult for a city to establish that a golf course is a "recreation place" within the meaning of § 38703 (than would be the case under § 37801), since § 38703 contains a list of specific items comprising recreation places that: (a) omits any express reference to golf courses; and (b) does not use terminology such as "including but not limited to," which would contemplate broader application beyond these itemized examples.

  • A 1970 Montgomery County Court decision in Upper Merion-Valley Forge Municipal Authority Condemnation which ruled that language in the Municipality Authorities Act permitting authorities to own and operate "parks" and "recreation grounds" was not sufficient to justify the exercise of eminent domain to condemn a private golf course for the purpose of converting it into a public golf course.

  • 6 P.S. § 1-406 of the Eminent Domain Code, which requires that a landowner must file preliminary objections within 30 days after being served with a notice of condemnation in order to contest the condemnor's legal authority to exercise the right of eminent domain.

This memorandum represents a personal opinion and has no official force or effect whatsoever.

If I can be of any further assistance, please let me know

ECH:kag

E-mails are welcome at nrsaha@aol.com
or call Dick and Nancy Saha at 610-383-4295